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A Radical Restructuring? A Response to Bell and 
Parchomovsky, Restructuring Copyright Infringe-
ment, 98 TEXAS L. REV. 679 (2020) 
 








In Restructuring Copyright Infringement, Abraham Bell and Gideon 
Parchomovsky call for a “radical reform in the way copyright law assigns 
liability.”1 The authors propose to split copyright infringement into three dis-
tinct categories—inadvertent, standard, and willful—and to tailor the reme-
dies offered to the copyright holder in each case. Under this system, the in-
advertent infringer would be subject to less severe penalties than the standard 
and willful infringer. Overall, this proposal is interesting, timely, and con-
tains a good deal of common sense.  
However, is it truly a “radical” proposal? In my opinion, the article’s 
recommendations do not go far enough. Rather than reforming copyright 
remedies, the underlying liability rule needs a more significant overhaul to 
meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. Elsewhere, I have argued that 
IP law (copyrights and patents) must be reformed around a negligence prin-
ciple.2 In the Information Age, it has become alarmingly easy to accidentally 
 
† Senior Lecturer in Law, The City Law School. 
1. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Restructuring Copyright Infringement, 98 TEXAS 
L. REV. 679, 683 (2020). 
2. See generally PATRICK R. GOOLD, IP ACCIDENTS: NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY IN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Cambridge University Press 2021) (forthcoming); Oren Bracha & Pat-
rick R. Goold, Copyright Accidents, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1025 (2016); Patrick R. Goold, Patent 
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infringe IP rights. For reasons of efficiency, equity, and fairness, our law 
ought to hold accidental infringers liable only when they have failed to adopt 
reasonable care to prevent the infringement. Accidental infringers who have 
acted with due care ought to be subject to no liability at all. 
In Part I of this response, I summarize the Bell and Parchomovsky re-
medial proposal in greater detail. In Part II, I highlight the major strengths of 
the proposal. In Part III, I turn to the weaknesses of the proposal. I conclude 
by arguing that copyright law could more efficiently solve the accident crisis 
by adopting a negligence liability rule.   
 
I. A Summary of the Proposal 
 
Copyright law employs a “one-size-fits-all strict liability regime.”3 De-
fendants will be held liable regardless of whether their infringements were 
intentional, negligent, or entirely innocent. Take, for example, the challenges 
faced by publishing companies. Palgrave Macmillan is a highly respected in-
ternational publisher of academic texts. But strangely, many of its books start 
with an apology. Open one of Palgrave’s recently published books and within 
the first pages you may find the following statement: “While every care has 
been taken to trace and acknowledge copyright, the publishers tender their 
apologies for any accidental infringement where copyright has proved un-
traceable.”4 Palgrave offers this boilerplate apology upfront because it under-
stands that it will be held strictly liable for any infringement contained in its 
books, even when it has taken “every care” to prevent that infringement. 
When this happens, Palgrave will be subject to the same set of remedies as a 
wilful infringer, i.e., actual damages, statutory damages, disgorgement of 
profits, seizure of infringing copies, and injunctions.5    
There is one exception to the uniformity of remedies. Under U.S. copy-
right law, courts have the discretion to reduce statutory damages to $200 per 
 
Accidents: Questioning Strict Liability in Patent Law, 95 IND. L.J. 1075 (2020); Patrick R. Goold, 
Moral Reflections on Strict Liability in Copyright, 44 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 123 (2021); see also 
Patrick R. Goold, Is Copyright Infringement a Strict Liability Tort?, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 305 
(2015). 
3. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 1, at 679. 
4. See e.g., RALPH HALL, APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH: PLANNING, DESIGNING AND 
CONDUCTING REAL-WORLD RESEARCH iv (Kellie Hughes, ed., 2008) (published by Palgrave Mac-
millan); see also SOTIRIOS SARANTAKOS, SOCIAL RESEARCH xxiii (4th ed. 2013) (published by 
Red Globe Press, a Palgrave Macmillan subsidiary). 
5. See 6 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 21:38 (describing copyright infringement 
as “a strict liability tort . . . for which there is joint and several liability”); 17 U.S.C. §§ 502–04 
(providing such remedies for all copyright infringement and differentiating willful infringement 
only as to the possibility of increased statutory damages). See also Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 
204 F.3d 601, 607 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that “[c]opyright infringement actions . . . ordinarily 
require no showing of intent to infringe” and noting that such knowledge or intent is “relevant in 
regard to damages”). 
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infringed work in cases of “innocent” infringement.6 However, it is question-
able how often this provision is used in practice. Pamela Samuelson and Tara 
Wheatland argue that the innocent infringer provision has “virtually no sig-
nificance” in litigation and is “essentially never used” by courts.7 Further-
more, this provision does not apply if the copyright owner elects to receive 
actual damages or disgorgement of profits. And courts continue to grant in-
junctions more or less routinely in these cases.  
Bell and Parchomovsky propose to introduce some more nuance into 
copyright’s remedial practices. The reform proposal would involve formally 
separating copyright infringement cases into three types. The first type is “in-
advertent infringement.” These are infringements which take place either 
subconsciously (i.e., where the defendant copies without awareness of their 
copying) or when the copying is “so small or questionable that a court could 
conclude that the infringer reasonably believed in good faith that nothing pro-
tectable was copied.”8 In these cases, the infringement should result in com-
pensatory damages only. On the other end of the spectrum is the second type 
of infringement, i.e., “wilful infringement.” This category includes “blatant 
and inexcusable” infringements like piracy.9 In this category, courts should 
be able to award the “full panoply of copyright remedies.”10 Lastly, in the 
middle is “standard infringement.” The standard infringer is “not blameless” 
but equally “not as culpable” as the wilful infringer.11 This would include 
cases where a defendant has, for example, an arguable claim to fair use but 
has mistakenly gone too far and copied too much. In such cases, courts should 
award the full range of monetary remedies but typically withhold injunctive 
relief. All infringements would be “presumptively standard” unless either 
“the defendant could prove her innocence or the plaintiff could prove will-
fulness or malice.”12  
The advantages of this proposal, according to Bell and Parchomovsky, 
are twofold. First, the proposal has “intuitive moral appeal.”13 It seems unfair 
to subject the innocent infringer to the same remedies as a deliberate in-
fringer. But even more importantly, the reform would help fulfil the utilitar-
ian objectives of federal copyright law. The authors highlight the problem of 
“risk of legal liability” in copyright.14 The cause of such risk is the 
 
6. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2018).  
7. Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in 
Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 453–54, 460 (2009). 
8. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 1, at 684–85. 
9. Id. at 685. 
10. Id. at 686. 
11. Id. at 685. 
12. Id. at 686. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
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“substantial information costs” produced by the copyright system.15 In the 
twenty-first century, a vast amount of creative material is protected by copy-
right; the copyright in that material lasts for a very long time; the scope of 
the copyright is often uncertain (due to vague doctrines such as substantial 
similarity and fair use); and without mandatory formalities such as registra-
tion and notice requirements, it is frequently impossible for actors to deter-
mine the legal status of works ex ante. Against this backdrop, limiting the 
remedies that the inadvertent infringer faces would have two effects. First, it 
would reduce “unnecessary barriers to entry by new authors.”16 And second, 
the proposal would  incentivize copyright holders “to make their claims 
known as widely as possible, so as to foreclose the possibility of innocent 
infringements.”17 In a nutshell, if copyright owners are unable to claim the 
full panoply of remedies from innocent infringers, then they will have a 
stronger incentive to engage in activities (like registration and notice) that 
reduce the probabilities of innocent infringement and increase the chances of 




Bell and Parchomovsky’s proposal is clearly a step in the right direction. 
Indeed, a number of us have been working on the same problem for some 
time. In 2010, Avihay Dorfman and Assaf Jacob released a paper called Cop-
yright as Tort.18 In the article, the authors highlighted how easy it is for indi-
viduals to infringe copyright accidentally due to underlying features of the 
copyright system such as long copyright terms and the vagueness of various 
copyright doctrines. They argued that copyright was therefore closer to the 
paradigm of “accident law” (i.e., the law of negligence in tort law) than the 
paradigm of “trespass.”19 In 2012, Stewart Sterk also highlighted that negli-
gence liability rules ought to be used more frequently in IP (and property 
generally) as a way to deal with the information costs leading to inadvertent 
infringement.20 In patent law, Tun-Jen Chiang made a similar argument.21 
Subsequently, Oren Bracha and I published Copyright Accidents in 
2016.22 This article built on the prior literature in two directions.  
 
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 686. 
17. Id. at 686–87. 
18. Avihay Dorfman & Assaf Jacob, Copyright as Tort, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 59 
(2011). 
19. Id. at 93–94. 
20. Stewart E. Sterk, Strict Liability and Negligence in Property Theory, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 
2129, 2136 (2012). 
21. Tun-Jen Chiang, The Reciprocity of Search, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5 (2013). 
22. Bracha & Goold, supra note 2. 
212 Texas Law Review Online [Vol. 99:208 
First, we refined the concept of “copyright accidents” or “accidental in-
fringement” of copyright. We argued that the key conceptual feature of acci-
dental infringement (which is shared by other types of accidents found in tort 
law) is the idea of “ex ante risk”.23 Users like Palgrave, mentioned above, 
cannot easily ascertain the legal status of the material they wish to copy. In 
such cases, users cannot bargain for permission ex ante because they do not 
know whether the work is protected or who the owner is. They are therefore 
faced with a situation where copying entails a risk of infringement (but not a 
certainty). 
Second, we used the economic literature from accident law to determine 
what is the most efficient liability rule to govern such accident cases. In a 
nutshell, we argued that accidental infringement ought to be governed by a 
negligence liability rule.24 The key advantage to a negligence liability rule is 
that it sets incentives for optimal bilateral care. Under a strict liability rule, 
the user has an incentive to adopt an efficient level of care to avoid accidental 
infringement. Unfortunately, the copyright owner does not have a similar in-
centive. Because copyright owners can receive damages in cases of acci-
dental infringement, they have insufficient incentives to engage in activities, 
such as registering their work with the Copyright Office or attaching notice, 
that would help reduce accidental infringement to an appropriate level. This 
problem is solved under a negligence regime. Under a negligence regime, 
users still have an incentive to take reasonable levels of care because doing 
so helps them avoid liability. But, unlike strict liability, owners now have an 
incentive to also take care. Since they are no longer compensated automati-
cally in cases of accidental infringement, their best financial strategy is to 
engage in activities that reduce the probability of accidents happening in the 
first place and increase the chances of ex ante licensing deals being reached.  
Since 2016, I have expanded upon this accidents problem in IP. In a 
forthcoming monograph, I argue that IP, particularly copyright and patents, 
requires serious reform to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.25 
In the nineteenth century, the probability of accidental infringement was rel-
atively low. As explored previously by R. Anthony Reese, and expanded 
upon by me, the nineteenth-century patent and copyright regimes contained 
numerous “safeguards” that limited the possibility of accidental infringe-
ment, such as mandatory notice and registration.26 With such safeguards in 
place, strict liability in IP was the appropriate rule. Illustratively, Judge 
Learned Hand went as far as to say that the legitimacy of strict liability in 
 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 1029. 
25. GOOLD, IP ACCIDENTS, supra note 2. 
26. R. Anthony Reese, Innocent Infringement in U.S. Copyright Law: A History, 30 COLUM. J. 
L. & ARTS 133, 135 (2007). 
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copyright was conditioned upon the presence of such safeguards. Without the 
registration and notice provisions of the copyright system, “it could not be a 
tort innocently to copy a copyrighted work,” he said.27   However, strict lia-
bility is clearly not the appropriate liability rule in the twenty-first century. 
In the past 150 years, the “safeguards” that operated to reduce the probability 
of accidents have been eroded. The consequence is that creative risk and lev-
els of accidental infringement have skyrocketed. Much as tort law developed 
the tort of negligence to deal with the skyrocketing of accident litigation in 
the nineteenth century,28 today IP law must adopt a negligence liability rule 
to efficiently, equitably, and fairly apportion responsibility in cases of acci-
dental IP infringement. Accidental infringers of copyright and patents should 
be liable for their infringements only if they have failed to take a reasonable 
level of care to prevent the infringement.  
As a result, I agree with Bell and Parchomovsky’s proposal in a number 
of ways. They are clearly right to highlight how high levels of risk lead to 
cases of inadvertent infringement (although I would prefer we use the term 
“accidents” to highlight the relationship between these accidents and their 
cousins in tort law). They are also right that leniency, in some cases, needs 
to be shown to the infringer in order to encourage bilateral care and thus min-
imize the social cost associated with IP accidents. And one way to achieve 
that outcome is indeed to change the remedial structure of copyright. All of 




So how ought we treat the accidental infringer? What solution will best 
encourage copyright owners and copyright users to take efficient levels of 
care and thus minimize the social costs associated with accidents? Putting 
aside the moral claims for the moment (due to space constraints),29 will the 
proposal adequately achieve the utilitarian policy of copyright? The answer 
is “probably not.”  
Despite some language to the contrary, Bell and Parchomovsky are not 
recommending any changes to the liability rule in IP. The proposal as it re-
lates to accidental infringers is to impose liability upon the infringer strictly, 
regardless of whether the user has taken reasonable care or not, and to require 
the infringer pay compensatory damages. This is the very definition of a strict 
 
27. Haas v. Leo Feist, Inc., 234 F. 105, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1916); see also Hein  v. Harris 175 F. 
875 (S.D.N.Y. 1910) (noting that whether or not defendant heard complainant’s song is irrelevant 
in determining if an infringement of the copyrighted song occurred); Stern v. Jerome H. Remick & 
Co., 175 F. 282, 282–83 (S.D.N.Y. 1910) (finding that a demonstration of defendant’s intent to 
violate a copyright was unnecessary where he had means to discover if a copyright existed). 
28. GOOLD, IP ACCIDENTS, supra note 2, at chapter 3. 
29. But considered further in GOOLD, IP ACCIDENTS supra note 2, at chapter 5. 
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liability rule!30 The proposal is therefore not really to change the liability rule 
but merely to impose a less draconian set of remedies on the infringer within 
the confines of a strict liability regime.  
Because Bell and Parchomovsky propose that the accidental infringer 
ought to be held strictly liable, the proposal is unlikely to achieve its stated 
aims. Under this proposal, the copyright owner will be compensated for the 
infringement every time that someone accidentally infringes their copyright. 
Why then would the copyright owner go to the expense and effort of trying 
to avoid the infringement? Taking care, such as registering their work, or 
ensuring that appropriate notice appears on all copies, etc., requires a certain 
amount of diligence, expenditure, and work on the part of the copyright 
owner. Why would the copyright owner bother engaging in these ex ante ac-
tivities when instead they can simply wait for the infringement to happen and 
claim damages ex post?  
To illustrate, consider the case of the University of Michigan’s Orphan 
Works Project (OWP). In May 2011, the University of Michigan announced 
it would begin to digitise out-of-print books from its library.31 The project 
would increase worldwide access to rare books and save some works from 
obscurity. But the project ran into troubles. It was difficult to determine 
whether the works were protected by copyright and, if so, who owned the 
rights. To avoid this problem, the university performed a search for any po-
tential copyright owners, published a list of the suspected ownerless works 
online, and called for rightsholders to come forward.32 When no copyright 
owners came forward, the university began to digitise the books. Later, the 
Authors Guild, a collective of American authors, alleged the project infringed 
its members’ copyrights and began legal action to halt digitisation. Mired in 
a legal quagmire, the project was suspended indefinitely.33  
The standard economic theory of accidents tells us that allowing the 
owner to claim compensatory damages in cases of accidents, like that in-
volved in the OWP case, will result in the owner taking less than optimal 
care.34 Consider the situation that the university found itself in. It was con-
sidering whether to digitise the out-of-print books. At that point in time, there 
was a certain probability (p) that digitisation would result in the accidental 
infringement of someone’s copyright causing financial loss (A) to the copy-
right holder (measured in terms of lost license fees). Both the university and 
the copyright owner could, however, take steps to reduce the probability of 
 
30. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENTS LAW 8 (2009) (“Under 
strict liability injurers must pay for all accident losses that they cause.”).  
31. Authors Guild, Inc. v. Hathitrust, 755 F. 3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 2014). 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. See SHAVELL, supra note 30, at 5–46 (Harvard University Press 2009); ROBERT COOTER & 
THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 201–04 (6th ed. 2016). 
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an accident (or pA). The university could search for the copyright owner and 
make its plans public. Doing so would cost a certain amount of time and 
money (Bu).35 Meanwhile, the copyright owner could register her rights with 
the Copyright Office and respond to the university’s calls for information 
about the works. This would likewise cost a certain amount of time and 
money (Bo).  
Now consider the effect that a compensatory damages rule would have 
on the parties’ incentives for care. Under such a rule, the university would be 
required to pay damages which are equal to the financial loss suffered by the 
copyright owner. Therefore, the university internalizes the costs of its pre-
caution and the probable cost of the accident (via damages). Assuming it is 
trying to minimize its own private costs, the university will select a level of 
care that minimizes the sum of both Bu + pA. Thus, we can expect a rule of 
compensatory damages to encourage the university to take an efficient level 
of care to prevent such accidents. However, what about the copyright owner? 
Under such a rule, the copyright owner does not internalize the probable costs 
of the accident (pA) because these costs are fully internalized by the univer-
sity. The copyright owner only internalizes the costs of her own precaution 
(Bo). Again, assuming she is trying to minimize her own private costs, the 
owner will select a level of care that minimizes Bo. In other words, the owner 
will take no care at all as this minimizes her private cost. Thus, under a com-
pensatory damages rule, the copyright owners in the OWP case still have an 
incentive to sit back and wait to claim damages ex post rather than doing the 
hard work ex ante to prevent the infringement. 
Consider how the situation would change under a negligence liability 
rule. Under such a rule, the university would only be held liable if it failed to 
take all reasonable care (where reasonable care is defined using the Hand 
formula, i.e. care is reasonable when B < PL). Under such a rule, the univer-
sity will still take reasonable care to avoid the infringement. If it fails to take 
reasonable care, then it internalizes both the expected costs of the accident 
(pA) and the cost of whatever precaution it does adopt (Bu). By contrast, if it 
adopts reasonable care, it only internalizes the cost of its care (Bu). This sets 
an incentive for it to adopt a reasonable level of care and thus avoid liability. 
In practical terms, we can predict that even under a negligence liability rule, 
the university would continue to act carefully (by searching the register and 
publicizing their intentions etc.) in order to avoid paying damages.  
By contrast, in cases where the user takes care, the copyright owner in-
ternalizes the remaining expected accident costs (pA) and whatever care she 
 
35. More specifically, taking more care would require an additional marginal expenditure. The 
greater care would correspond to a marginal reduction in the expected accident costs. Whether the 
marginal expenditure on care is cost-justified depends on whether it is higher or lower than the 
marginal reduction in expected accident costs. 
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adopts (Bo). Therefore, she has an incentive to select a level of care that min-
imizes the sum of Bo + pA. Or more simply, in a case like the OWP one, the 
copyright owner could predict that under a negligence liability rule, the uni-
versity would behave reasonably, and thus she would not be compensated for 
any lost license fees she suffers. In this case, her best strategy is to take rea-
sonable car, such as registering and responding to calls for information, to 
avoid the accident and increase the chances of reaching licensing deals ex 
ante.  
Thus, unlike the Bell and Parchomovsky solution of imposing a com-
pensatory damages rule on the user, a negligence liability rule will lead to 
optimal incentives for bilateral care. Yet, Bell and Parchomovsky only cur-
sorily consider the role that negligence ought to play within copyright at the 




What is animating the Bell and Parchomovsky proposal is just how dra-
conian copyright remedies currently are. Today, U.S. copyright law is in the 
unenviable position that it likely overcompensates copyright owners for the 
harm they suffer. What Bell and Parchomovsky have suggested is changing 
the rules so that copyright owners in cases of accident are merely compen-
sated for their loss, rather than enjoying the supra-compensatory rents that 
statutory damages provide. This is clearly a step in the right direction, but it 
does not go far enough. Holding accidental infringers strictly liable and ex-
pecting them to compensate the copyright owner in all cases is better than the 
current status quo, but it still will result in copyright owners taking insuffi-
cient care to prevent accidents ex ante and merely waiting to claim damages 
ex post. A better solution would be to adopt a negligence liability rule. Under 
this rule, negligent users should pay compensatory damages, but careful and 
reasonable users should pay nothing. This would give both the copyright 
owner and copyright user an incentive to take reasonable care to avoid acci-
dents and thus minimize the costs of copyright accidents. And, as explored 
in IP Accidents, this is not the only benefit of reforming IP law around a 
negligence liability principle. 
 
36 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 1, at 731–32; cf Bracha & Goold, supra note 2, at 1040–62. 
